The Simulation of Scandal: Hack-and-Leak Operations, the Gulf States, and U.S. Politics by Shires, J.
 
 
The Simulation of Scandal: Hack-and-Leak 
Operations, the Gulf States, and U.S. Politics 
 
Abstract: Four hack-and-leak operations in U.S. politics between 2016 and 2019, publicly attributed to the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, should be seen as the “simulation of scandal”: 
deliberate attempts to direct moral judgement against their target. Although “hacking” tools enable easy 
access to secret information, they are a double-edged sword, as their discovery means the scandal 
becomes about the hack itself, not about the hacked information. There are wider consequences for cyber 
competition in situations of constraint where both sides are strategic partners, as in the case of the United 
States and its allies in the Persian Gulf. 
 
Hack-and-leak operations (HLO) are a frontier in digital forms of foreign interference, epitomized by the 
success of Russian intelligence agencies in obtaining and disseminating documents from the Democratic 
National Committee (DNC) during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign.1 HLOs and other 
information operations are widely seen as a severe threat to liberal democratic structures and U.S. 
policymakers have mobilized significant resources in response, including threat intelligence and 
cybersecurity protections, increased election and voting security, legislative pressure on social media 
companies, and even offensive cyberattacks.2  
This “whole-of-nation” approach is largely based on the events of the 2016 U.S. election, and specifically 
Russian interference in the election process.3 However, it is hard to pinpoint the exact impact of the 
Russian disinformation operations.4 Controversial candidates, a combative and polarized media 
environment, and entrenched economic and social divisions were all key factors in the 2016 election 
result. Furthermore, foreign interest in the U.S. election was not limited to the Russian government; other 
state and non-state actors also sought to influence candidate campaigns in their favor.5 The danger is that 
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academic and policy understandings of HLO are over-reliant on a single case. This article therefore asks: 
How do other HLO cases alter our understanding of this new phenomenon, including motives, means, and 
consequences? 
HLO occur frequently worldwide, but their political contexts vary widely and have uncertain implications 
for U.S. politics.6 Consequently, this article expands our understanding of HLO through a detailed 
qualitative analysis of four operations that targeted political figures in the United States in the period 
following the DNC operation (October 2016 to January 2019), thus keeping the political and media 
environment constant as far as possible. These cases replicate many of the striking features of the DNC 
operation: access through phishing, the release of large collections of emails, publication in national media 
outlets, and even direct references to “DCLeaks,” the identity assumed by the Russian intelligence 
agencies to disseminate the DNC documents. These cases have been publicly attributed to governments 
in the Middle East, namely Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and thus broaden 
conceptions of digital foreign interference to allies as well as adversaries. 
This article argues that HLO are the “simulation of scandal”: deliberate attempts to direct public moral 
judgement against their target. The success of HLO depends on the shifting power dynamic between the 
scandal-maker and the scandal-subject; referred to in Arabic as kāshif and makshūf, respectively. At the 
center of this dynamic are the digital technologies used to obtain and release secret information. These 
hacking tools are a double-edged sword, as their discovery often means the scandal becomes about the 
hack itself, not about the hacked information; in other words, the kāshif becomes the makshūf. These 
cases also highlight other overlooked aspects of HLO: the utility of “activist” cover, the involvement of 
new actors such as public relations (PR) agencies and law firms, and the leaker’s wary reliance on 
mistrustful relationships with traditional media. Finally, the article identifies wider consequences for cyber 
competition in situations of constraint where both sides are strategic partners. In such situations, HLO 
offer a powerful but indirect and unpredictable means of influence. 
The first section places HLO within the literature on cyber conflict and information operations. The second 
section draws on sociological accounts of mediatized and digitalized leaks to explore the simulation of 
scandal. The rest of the article concerns the four case studies: The third section provides an overview of 
each case; the fourth analyzes their coverage in prominent media outlets; and the fifth discusses reasons 
behind their differing effects. A conclusion places this discussion in a broader strategic context, highlights 
limitations, and suggests further work. 
Contextualizing Hack-and-Leaks 
The contemporary media environment is congested, globalized, and securitized. Online publications and 
social media platforms compete for the scarce resource of users’ attention, driven by logics of ranking, 
profiling, and advertising.7 Users can access content from almost anywhere in the world, produced by a 
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variety of actors with intertwined (geo)political, commercial, and normative motivations.8 Media 
organizations and publications are increasingly enfolded into narratives of national security that demand 
urgent legislative and policy solutions. These three characteristics destabilize existing media authorities 
and gatekeepers with both positive and negative effects: They democratize debate while lowering 
editorial standards; provide a safe space for alternative identities while encouraging extremist positions; 
and offer new opportunities for both education and foreign interference. This Janus-like evolution is now 
most commonly represented with its uglier face forward, wearing the labels of “fake news,” “post-truth,” 
and “the end of objectivity.”9 Hastily proposed remedies are uncomfortable in some states, where they 
strain creaking structures of liberal democracy, yet are music to the ears of authoritarian leaders in other 
states, where repressive information controls and restrictions on speech resonate with efforts to mobilize 
the threat of foreign propaganda to bolster the incumbent regime.10 
Leaks — the release of secret or confidential information into the public domain — occupy a special place 
in this divisive and frenetic world. In an era where trust online is frequently misplaced, the term “leak” is 
a rare marker of authenticity, intimating unmediated truth and unbalancing its targets. The amount of 
information released by leaks has increased dramatically, creating “mega” or “deluge” leaks, although this 
increase probably remains proportionate to the amount of data held by organizations.11 Leaks have 
precipitated seismic recent events in world politics, from the U.S. cables that prompted Tunisian anger at 
elite corruption in late 2010 and contributed to the Arab Spring revolutions, to the Snowden revelations 
in 2013 that exposed the hypocrisy of the United States and its allies in extolling the benefits of global 
online access while simultaneously expanding digital surveillance architectures.  
Unfortunately, not all mega leaks land on fortuitously aligned domestic and geopolitical fault lines. The 
documentation of horrifically bureaucratic torture and murder in Syrian jails, smuggled out by a former 
forensic photographer, has met the same silence and stalemate as other war crimes in that complex, 
grinding conflict.12 Furthermore, although anonymous official sources and whistleblowers have always 
been an important element of political reportage, leaks are an everyday occurrence. Politicians and other 
media figures — and, unfortunately, ordinary young people — are now resigned to the expectation that 
classified documents, compromising photos, or candid conversations will eventually appear in their 
supposed (sometimes doctored) entirety.13 Organizations, individuals, and digital devices are, in Wendy 
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Hui Kyong Chun and Sarah Friedland’s words, very “promiscuous”: they “routinely work through an 
alleged ‘leaking’ that undermines the separation of the personal and the networked.”14 
Digital media are not only the means of dissemination for leaked information, but often also their source, 
through data breaches and HLO, also known as “doxing.” Doxing — the acquisition and publication of 
another individual’s private information — is one of the oldest practices in cyberspace. Originally, to “dox” 
(from “documents”) someone meant simply revealing their offline identity, either for “lulz” — for little 
discernible reason beyond personal enjoyment — or to embarrass those who transgressed early norms of 
behavior on the internet.15 As the internet grew, doxing became more sophisticated, using both intensive 
open-source investigation and intrusion into the target’s systems to obtain sensitive information. The 
targets changed too, from tit-for-tat spats within hacker communities to the publication of personally 
identifiable information for thousands of government and corporate employees.16 These later events are 
“public-interest hacks,” in Gabriella Coleman’s description of the hacker collective Anonymous,17 or what 
Bruce Schneier has called “political” or “organizational” doxing.18 Both leaks and doxes can release objects 
and capabilities in the form of computer code, as well as more traditional text documents.19  
Finally, doxing and leaking actors have strong motivations to muddy the distinction between the two. 
Apparently leaked information may in fact result from an external intrusion obscured by journalists or 
lawyers for legal reasons, while victims may claim to have been hacked for the opposite reason, to 
facilitate insurance claims and avoid scrutiny. To make the overlap between doxing and leaking clear, I 
use “hack-and-leak operation (HLO),” which reminds us of both the usual sequence of events (hack and 
then leak), as well as the frequent blurring of boundaries between hacking and leaking. 
Hack-and-leak operations fit into a long history of the manipulation of information for national security 
purposes, which is centrally the preserve and currency of intelligence agencies.20 Espionage in the modern 
era relies as much on signals intelligence — telecoms, radio, and now internet communications — as 
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traditional human sources, sometimes competing but now largely integrated.21 Intelligence agencies have 
also dominated the weaponization of espionage tools for “effects” such as disruption or damage.22 
Intelligence practices have a complex relationship with leaking. First, third-party leaks are valuable sources 
and the extent of private information on the internet means open- or all-source intelligence can be as 
powerful as secret methods. Second, intelligence agencies in democracies rely on popular support, 
regularly shaping policy and public perception through non-classic routes, leading to David Pozen’s 
description of the U.S. government as a strategically “leaky leviathan.”23 Third, leaking — and the threat 
of leaking — is an effective way to damage adversaries or to convince people to provide information.24 
Leaking, for intelligence agencies, is thus both a powerful tool and their greatest fear, leading to insularity 
and internal suspicion.25  
Hack-and-leak operations are at the pinnacle of digital disinformation operations conducted by 
intelligence agencies, combining intrusion into networks with coordinated and doctored dissemination 
through traditional and social media. The growing literature on cyber conflict in strategic studies and 
international relations has astutely recognized how cyber operations in general are one means of 
exploiting economic, social, and technological openness on the internet for strategic gain.26 This 
scholarship has many insights relevant to HLO, indicating a propensity for actors to conduct operations in 
the “gray zone” between peace and outright conflict.27 It also highlights the creative and improvisatory 
nature of such operations in the context of rapidly evolving legal and technological responses, including a 
shifting background of “cyber norms” that offer a set of apparent constraints but, more realistically, serve 
as guiding lights for how the strategic pressure created by such operations can best be applied.28  
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However, the characterization of hack-and-leak operations purely as an aspect of antagonistic foreign 
relations between states fails to appreciate the complexity of the globalized and congested media 
environment sketched above. Consequently, hack-and-leak operations, especially those linked to the idea 
of “scandal,” need to be located within sociological models of digital media and information politics 
outside national security contexts. 
Scandal and Simulation 
Scandals are a subset of leaks, as there can be no scandal without a disclosure of secret information (even 
if this information is only “secret” in the oxymoronic sense noted by Eva Horn, i.e. spoken of ad infinitum 
as secret).29 Although nearly all scholars of scandal agree that moral transgression is at the core of the 
concept, they disagree over how best to theorize it.30 Some distinguish the type of transgression; John B. 
Thompson’s influential work suggests that values of trust and reputation separate political scandals from 
other forms.31 In contrast, more anthropological approaches focus instead on the role of scandals in 
maintaining and reinforcing existing societal norms and values by providing an opportunity — and an 
obligation — to condemn a specific action that transgresses those norms.32 Scandal thus requires what 
might be termed normative dissonance: a divergence between expected and observed or practiced norms 
and moral standards.33  
This is illustrated most clearly through the figure of a whistleblower: One who witnesses or participates 
in actions that are contrary to their values, and yet is informed by those around them that these actions 
are normal or otherwise legitimate.34 Michael Walzer calls whistleblowing “moral risk-taking” due to the 
bet that the whistleblower’s moral position will resonate more with society at large than that of their 
peers.35 We can see the power of scandal in the DNC leaks, turning the release of private information into 
condemnation of a moral transgression.36 These leaks portrayed a clear normative dissonance between 
Hilary Clinton’s projected image of trust and competence and accusations of “crooked Hilary” 
representing the “swamp” which came after the leak. 
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Although the concept of scandal enriches our understanding of the impact of HLO, the scholarship on 
scandal above does not directly address the issue of disinformation. The focus of these works is the 
presence of moral norms and their violation, rather than whether leaked information is verifiably true. 
Other sociological thought on scandal, especially that of Jean Baudrillard, explicitly cautions us against 
seeing leaks as simply revealing the truth. Baudrillard extends the anthropological insight of social 
reinforcement through scandal from purely moral norms to norms of truth, rationality, and reason. In his 
words, “It is always a question of proving the real by the imaginary, proving truth by scandal, [and] proving 
the law by transgression.”37 Scandals thus not only involve the airing and confirmation of certain values, 
but also commitment to rational argument and standards of truth.  
However, for Baudrillard, these standards are not objective and so scandals are “an arbitrary stop to this 
revolving causality,” a last-ditch attempt to save “a principle of political reality.”38 This arbitrariness means 
there is no such thing as a “true” scandal. Instead, all scandals are simulated, an arbitrary attempt at 
resisting relativism within a world of ungrounded uncertainty. Hence his declaration that “Watergate is 
not a scandal” but that “Watergate succeeded in imposing the idea that Watergate was a scandal … the 
reinjection of a large dose of political morality on a global scale.”39 Baudrillard’s ideas, although developed 
half a century ago, have clear relevance today, when standards of truth are a frequent object of 
manipulation and a tool in power struggles.40 We should be skeptical of taking scandals at face value, 
instead seeing exposure, denunciation, and counter-denunciation all as part of a single phenomenon. 
However, Baudrillard’s view deliberately bypasses the specific motives, tactics, and identities of the 
entities involved. In contrast, more recent scholarship, especially the work of Tarek El-Ariss on digital 
culture and literature in the Arab world, highlights how people confront normative dissonance. As he 
argues, there are “two forms of knowledge: a knowledge that is already known or assumed to be true, 
and an embarrassing if not scandalous knowledge from which no one can turn away … Simultaneous acts 
of reading and knowing – knowing together, all at the same time – constitute the scandalous effect of the 
leak and make it embarrassing to those in power.”41 El-Ariss’ argument goes on to make a useful 
distinction between the subject and object of the scandal: in Arabic, between kāshif (revealer) and 
makshūf (revealed).42 He suggests that these two roles exchange and even overlap, especially as leaks 
develop and spread. Consequently, “scene-making and exposure … capture the breakdown of 
subject/object relation in a new digital landscape.”43  
Like Baudrillard, El-Ariss traces the larger political implications of this delicately balanced and constantly 
shifting kāshif/makshūf relationship, concluding that “the dialectics of leaking and containing the leak 
expose the mechanism of prohibition and the failure or porousness of this mechanism at the same time.”44 
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We can see this political contest and shifting boundaries in the 2016 election, as both the Clinton and 
Trump campaigns repeatedly vied to portray themselves as kāshif, revealing lies and transgressions of 
their opponent, and avoid the identity of makshūf, the morally culpable and uncovered subject. More 
specifically, the DNC emails represented a crucial shift between the two, as a leaked recording of Donald 
Trump (the “Access Hollywood” tape) was overshadowed by the documents from the DNC focusing on 
Clinton’s record in government.45 
Our understanding of HLO is deepened in several ways by sociological works on scandal. First, scandal is 
prevalent across different moral contexts, leading to a focus on its mechanics rather than content. Second, 
the truth as revealed by scandal is always contested and challenged, and is sometimes even simulated. 
Third, in a fast-flowing digital media environment with constant accusations and leaks, political actors 
seek to gain the upper hand through competing scandal-making, jostling to be kāshif rather than makshūf. 
Cases of HLOs in U.S. politics demonstrate how hacking tools are the fulcrum of this struggle over 
identities, altering the balance of power between adversaries. The use of cyber tools brings the identity 
of whistleblower (kāshif al-ʾasrār, leaker of secrets) close to that of hacker (hakar, mukhtariq). When the 
hack becomes the focus of moral judgement and attention, rather than the leak itself, the kāshif becomes 
the makshūf. 
HLO in U.S. Politics 
The selected cases of HLO examined in this section all took place in the United States in the three years 
following the 2016 U.S. presidential election. This section provides an overview of the publicly available 
detail of each case in chronological order. The four cases, and selected characteristics, are summarized in 
Table 1. The cases were selected to keep the political and media environment constant as far as possible, 
in comparison to selecting cases from other countries. They were also selected because all four subjects 
are political actors of some form, even if they do not all hold official positions in government. Only one 
(Al-Otaiba) has such a position (as the UAE ambassador); the others are politically influential due to their 
connections and/or financial power. As such, the concept of politics I use for case selection is broad, 
encapsulating other individuals and organizations that have a significant influence over knowledge, policy, 
and action.46 
In each case, as will become clear in the overviews, the individuals involved are enmeshed in a variety of 
schemes and relationships with Gulf leaders, local governments, or influential companies (and the three 
overlap to a significant extent). Consequently, these cases were selected not only because they all take 
place within the scope of U.S. politics, but also because they illustrate how domestic politics in the United 
States are inseparable from U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Middle East.47 Some media commentators 
cited below have therefore described the United States as merely a “battleground” for Gulf rivalries, but 
this goes too far in the opposite direction. Although U.S. politics is clearly not immune to the influences 
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of other states, the United States is not a neutral place for Gulf struggles to play out: Domestic divisions 
and coalitions matter just as much as foreign interests or objectives.  
Table 1: Selected HLOs in U.S. Politics 
Subject of leak Farhad Azima Yusuf Al-Otaiba Elliot Broidy Jeff Bezos 
Date of first leak Oct. 22, 2016 June 2, 2017 March 2, 2018 Jan. 21, 2019 
Public attribution 
(denied, all cases) 
UAE/Iran  Qatar/Russia  Qatar Saudi Arabia 
Leaker’s assumed 
identity 
- Activist Activist - 
Intermediaries 
allegedly involved 





Type of release Coordinated with 
papers of record 
Coordinated with 
papers of record 
Coordinated with 
papers of record 
Coordinated with 
tabloid 
Type of scandal Financial, political Moral, financial, 
political 
Financial, political Moral 
Responses from 


















Farhad Azima is an Iranian-American businessman in the aviation sector who was reportedly an asset for 
the CIA during the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s.48 He was also named as the owner of a British Virgin 
Islands-based air transport company in the Panama Papers, a leak exposing corruption in tax havens, in 
early 2016. On Oct. 22, 2016, the UAE newspaper The National stated that Azima and the investment fund 
of the emirate Ras Al-Khaimah (RAKIA) had issued simultaneous lawsuits on Sept. 30, 2016 against each 
other in Washington, D.C. and London, regarding his role as a broker for a hotel purchase in Tbilisi, 
Georgia. Later lawsuits suggested that the dispute also involved accusations of arbitrary detention and 
prisoner abuse in Ras Al-Khaimah. Azima’s 2016 submission claimed that “a massive volume of emails and 
other electronic data” had been taken by RAKIA through an intrusion into his computers in August 2016.49  
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RAKIA denied the claim and sympathetic Arab media only covered RAKIA’s submission.50 Later court 
documents stated that Azima’s devices had first been compromised in October 2015, and then in mid-
2016 websites had appeared with names such as “Farhad Azima Scammer,” including BitTorrent links to 
Azima’s emails and iCloud data.51 Eight months later, on June 21, 2017, the Associated Press published an 
article on Azima’s past relying on “a recently obtained collection of tens of thousands of emails his lawyers 
say was stolen by hackers.”52 This was accompanied by a separate article detailing how contact between 
Azima and The Wall Street Journal correspondent Jay Solomon had led the paper to terminate Solomon’s 
contract. The Wall Street Journal claimed that Solomon had violated ethical obligations and professional 
standards in his contact with Azima.53 
Solomon’s own account of this contact emphasized that the hacked data, posted online on Sept. 13, 2016, 
included a file named “Fraud Between Farhad Azima and Jay Solomon.” Solomon thus inferred that he 
was one of the targets of the hack, and blamed Iranian state-sponsored actors due to the Iranian focus of 
his reporting at The Wall Street Journal.54 Solomon also repeated Azima’s lawyers’ claim that the hackers 
“inserted spyware into his [Azima’s] computer.” Solomon claimed that RAKIA’s public relations 
consultants, Bell Pottinger, had sent the hacked data to international media outlets, including The Wall 
Street Journal, suggesting that “the information operation had been incredibly effective.” A friend of 
Solomon’s published an article in Bloomberg stating that the “biased curation” of the data by the 
Associated Press constituted a clear information operation.55 In June 2018 the Qatari outlet Al Jazeera 
used further court documents to attribute the hack to RAKIA, noting that the judge found it was “beyond 
dispute” that hackers had been involved and that Azima’s claim of RAKIA’s involvement was “plausible.”56 
Most recently, a court judgement in the United Kingdom in May 2020 found against Azima on the matter 
of the Tbilisi hotel, instructing him to pay $4 million to RAKIA, and decided that his claim of RAKIA’s 
responsibility for the hack-and-leak operation was not proven by the circumstantial evidence provided.57  
This case demonstrates the complexity of HLO. The provenance of the leak in a hacking operation was 
quickly seized upon by Azima’s opponents and questioned by his supporters, with subsidiary effects on 
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Azima’s contacts, such as Solomon. Lawsuits ongoing before, during, and after the leak struggled to deal 
adequately with the information revealed, but their careful conclusions were nonetheless leveraged by 
polarized media to shift the scandal as it developed.  
Yusuf Al-Otaiba 
On June 2, 2017, three days before a diplomatic split between Qatar on one hand and the UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other, several news organizations in the United States received 
messages from a group called GlobalLeaks, containing copies of emails from the Hotmail account of the 
UAE ambassador to the United States, Yusuf Al-Otaiba, between 2014 and 2017. As reported by The Daily 
Beast, the purpose of GlobalLeaks was to “reveal how million[s] of dollars were used to hurt [the] 
reputation[s] of American allies and cause policy change,” and thus show “how a small rich 
country/company used lobbyists to hurt American interests and those of it[s] allies.”58 Although 
GlobalLeaks claimed the emails came from a paid whistleblower based in Washington, D.C., The Daily 
Beast suggested they were printed out directly from a hacked Hotmail account. GlobalLeaks used a free 
email account with a Russian provider, and the subject line of their email was “DC Leaks - The Lobbyist 
Edition Part 1,” referencing the website used to publish emails from the DNC hack. According to The 
Huffington Post, GlobalLeaks denied any allegiance to Qatar or another government.59 
Other news outlets continued to publish revelations from Al-Otaiba’s account after what The Wall Street 
Journal called a “new release” of emails at the end of July 2017. The New York Times published a story 
about the opening of a Taliban embassy in Doha rather than Abu Dhabi,60 while The Wall Street Journal 
focused on Al-Otaiba’s relationship with a Malaysian state development fund. The Wall Street Journal 
named GlobalLeaks as their source, with the stated motivation to “expose corruption, [and] financial 
frauds which are done by rich governments.”61 At the end of August 2017, The Intercept reported on Al-
Otaiba’s personal life, including sexual conduct and a “party” lifestyle, using emails beginning in 2007. This 
story claimed that some of Al-Otaiba’s emails had already been posted to an online chatroom in 2009 but 
were then removed. These emails had been seen by the journalist for The Intercept in 2015.62 A further 
release occurred on Sept. 13, 2017, including stories in The Intercept and Middle East Eye on Egyptian 
lobbying in the United States.63  
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In terms of political consequences, the Al-Otaiba leaks were significant in demonstrating how Al-Otaiba 
worked both sides of the aisle in Washington, D.C. He was close to the Obama administration, arranging 
closed high-level meetings and disparaging the Trump campaign. He then became equally close to the 
Trump administration, with some media reports suggesting that the investigation into election 
interference by Special Counsel Robert Mueller took an “interest” in the emails as evidence of contact 
with Trump advisors prior to the election.64 Although UAE contacts are dealt with extensively in the 
Mueller report, redactions mean it is unclear what role, if any, these leaked emails played in Mueller’s 
investigation. 65 
This case demonstrates how a single HLO has a bearing on several domestic and geopolitical planes 
simultaneously, including the Qatar split, U.S. strategy in the Gulf, investigations into Russian interference 
and other influences on the U.S. election, and salacious stereotypes of rich Arab lifestyles in the United 
States. It also reveals how closely HLO actors can mimic other operations, sowing confusion about 
attribution.  
Elliott Broidy 
Elliot Broidy is a Republican lobbyist with extensive business ties to the UAE. The Huffington Post first 
reported leaked emails from Broidy’s email account on March 2, 2018, from a group named “L.A. 
Confidential” whose stated purpose was to “expose people associated with Hollywood” (Broidy’s wife, 
Robin Rosenzweig, is a Hollywood lawyer). The documents included emails Broidy wrote to himself, 
offering insights into his personal thoughts as well as private communications.66 A second release of 
documents was published by the Associated Press on May 21, 2018.67 The New York Times published a 
comprehensive story on Broidy’s relationships with other lobbyists and fixers at the same time.68 The BBC 
used Broidy’s emails to reveal that former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was under political pressure 
prior to his resignation, and quoted a spokesman for Broidy claiming that “we have reason to believe this 
hack was sponsored and carried out by registered and unregistered agents of Qatar.”69 In May 2018, 
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Bloomberg reported that the compromise probably occurred when Rosenzweig received an email on Dec. 
27, 2017 with an apparent Gmail security alert. She reportedly reset her password while on the spoofed 
page, allowing the malicious actor access to a Google Doc with more passwords including an account at 
Broidy’s finance company.70  
Further details of the compromise have emerged from a series of lawsuits issued by Broidy against the 
state of Qatar and its agents. The first lawsuit claimed that from January to March 2018 an email server 
at Broidy’s finance company had been compromised, with an initial forensic analysis identifying IP 
addresses for VPN services in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Later analysis also identified non-
VPN connections from Qatari IP addresses.71 The lawsuit was dismissed as the court had no jurisdiction 
over foreign sovereign entities.72 A separate lawsuit in a New York court against a U.N. official was also 
dismissed.73 According to Broidy’s lawsuits, Qatar’s public relations firms called many news outlets during 
this period and spoke frequently with the Associated Press just before the story about Broidy’s emails was 
published. The most recent lawsuit, in documents filed in March 2020, alleges that a company named 
Global Risk Advisors (GRA) was responsible for the hack, although no further evidence is provided.74 
Overall, one of the main consequences of the leaked documents was to expose Broidy’s commercial 
relationships with the UAE and Saudi governments through a military contracting company, Circinus. The 
documents also highlighted his contacts with individuals indicted for channeling “illicit donations” from 
the UAE to the Trump presidential campaign, and Broidy is reportedly under federal investigation for his 
relationship to the UAE.75  
This case reinforces several aspects of the first two, including supposedly activist or ideological 
motivations and a swift descent into “lawfare” (legal warfare) as a response to the leak. This leak was 
assimilated into several orthogonal agendas, again including the Qatar split and election interference, and 
highlights the key role of PR companies on both sides of the HLO. 
Jeff Bezos 
Jeff Bezos is the founder and CEO of Amazon and owner of The Washington Post. On Jan. 21, 2019 The 
National Enquirer published a report about Bezos’ extra-marital relationship with Lauren Sanchez, a 
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television host in Los Angeles, based on text messages between the two in late 2016.76 Within days, 
several news outlets speculated that the leak was politically motivated due to The Washington Post’s 
coverage of President Trump, although at this stage “a digital forensic analysis turned up no evidence of 
a hack and the theory was quickly discounted.”77 On Feb. 7, 2019, Bezos wrote an article claiming that the 
owner of The National Enquirer had attempted to blackmail him with “intimate photos” Bezos had sent 
to Sanchez. Bezos linked this attempt to his own investigation of how his text messages had been leaked, 
as well as The Washington Post’s coverage of murdered Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, because the 
letter he claimed to have received stated he should publicly state that he has “no knowledge or basis for 
suggesting that [The National Enquirer’s] coverage was politically motivated or influenced by political 
forces.”78 The Saudi foreign minister, Adel Jubair, denied any involvement.79 On Feb. 12, 2019, the 
Associated Press published a story claiming that Bezos’ investigation had determined that Lauren 
Sanchez’s brother, Michael Sanchez, was the source of the message and photos.80  
In March 2019, Bezos’ private investigator published his own account, stating that “our investigators and 
several experts concluded with high confidence that the Saudis had access to Bezos’ phone, and gained 
private information.”81 He did not provide any further details other than interviews with “leading 
cybersecurity experts who have tracked Saudi spyware.” He also stated that The National Enquirer 
appeared to have access to Bezos’ messages before contacting Michael Sanchez, basing his conclusion on 
media reports. The private investigator implied that the Saudi government targeted Bezos in several ways 
due to The Washington Post’s coverage of the Khashoggi killing, including on social media, and that the 
leaked messages were part of this targeting. Saudi Arabia repeated its denial of involvement following 
this article.82 Finally, in January 2020 several news outlets used the leaked contents of a technical 
investigation into Bezos’ phone to conclude that it was likely compromised with malware that behaves in 
a manner similar to a commercial product alleged to be used by the Saudi government.83 This report 
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contained only circumstantial evidence,84 but the association with Saudi Arabia was repeated by United 
Nations special rapporteurs investigating Saudi Arabia’s human rights record.85  
Following this report, media articles stated that Bezos met and swapped phone numbers with Saudi Crown 
Prince Muhammad bin Salman at a dinner with other Silicon Valley investors several weeks before the 
alleged hack, during bin Salman’s visit promoted heavily by The National Enquirer.86 However, 
disagreements over sourcing continued, as The Wall Street Journal used leaked documents from a federal 
investigation to argue that Michael Sanchez provided the original texts to The National Enquirer.87 These 
explanations are not mutually exclusive: It is possible that Bezos’ phone was infected and that Michael 
Sanchez provided the texts, or that the leak was double-sourced, or that either is incorrect.  
This case amplifies the prurient strains of the Al-Otaiba case, with headlines dominated by details of the 
affair, divorce, and division of assets of the world’s richest man. But there was also a constant political 
undertone, with Saudi overtures to Silicon Valley and subsequent fissures generating ample grist to a 
speculative mill well before the results of any investigation. Overall, these four cases have both evident 
similarities and several key differences. The trajectory of each case turns on whether the media chooses 
to focus on the leaker or the subject of the leak as their main story: in other words, whether the scandal 
is about the kāshif or the makshūf. 
Media Coverage 
Although it is extremely difficult to judge the overall impact of a hack-and-leak operation, there were 
several immediate consequences from the four cases considered here. According to the UK judge, the 
Azima leak was decisive in his decision instructing Azima to pay $4 million to RAKIA.88 Although the Azima 
leak led to the termination of Solomon’s employment at The Wall Street Journal, Solomon was apparently 
only an incidental target. Bezos and those in his personal life were severely affected by the leak, but his 
political and economic influence has not diminished. In the Al-Otaiba and Broidy cases, their targets were 
temporarily excluded from their usual lobbying circuits. For example, Broidy’s lawyers cite in a claim 
document WhatsApp messages between Qatari agents, indicating some direct consequences for Broidy’s 
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lobbying career.89 However, Broidy and Al-Otaiba returned quickly to these political circles afterwards.90 
Due to redactions, it remains unclear whether Broidy is mentioned in the Mueller report following 
connections revealed through his and Al-Otaiba’s leaked emails, though Broidy is reportedly under 
investigation for other activities during the election.  
Overall, in contrast to the DNC leaks, the long-term impact from these leaks remains uncertain. However, 
it is possible to gauge the impact of each leak through the coverage in major media outlets. All four cases 
involved relationships with traditional media outlets: Broidy, Al-Otaiba, and Azima were associated with 
highly regarded news services or papers of record, while the Bezos case involved the celebrity tabloid The 
National Enquirer. This focus on traditional media seems slightly anachronistic, as people now consume 
much of their news and commentary through social media. However, traditional media outlets still play a 
foundational role in political debate. Although their role as gatekeepers is no longer well-defined, many 
such outlets have adapted to the new media environment, though they now have new commercial 
incentives for production and content. Moreover, this focus appears to have been a strategic choice by 
the leakers. In the Azima case, Solomon describes the leaker contacting many media outlets until the 
Associated Press “bit” and published the documents.91 The Broidy case suggests even closer relationships 
with specific organizations, as there were allegedly repeated conversations with news organizations prior 
to each release.92 
I measured the media coverage of these cases by identifying the top fifty results of a structured Google 
search conducted in June 2019 (Figure 1).93 Google’s algorithm ranks websites based on a complex mix of 
content, search frequency, and connections, serving as an adequate proxy for the popularity of an online 
news article without measuring specific page visits or visitor behavior.94 In each case nearly all results 
were news articles and the total count was sufficient to capture the main waves of publication, as relevant 
results after fifty were usually recycled articles from secondary sites. The exception is the Azima case, 
where there were 31 results in total. Plotting the dates of these results shows that media coverage of 
these leaks occurred in short spikes, representing a brief news cycle: The story hits the press, is covered 
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by various outlets in the following days, then disappears. These spikes occur multiple times for each case, 
so there are repeated “waves” when new documents are leaked.  
Figure 1: Hack-and-leak Media Coverage, 2016-2019 
 
 
Although the analysis above provides an indication of media coverage over time, it does not distinguish 
between two forms of coverage crucial to my argument on the simulation of scandal: stories that focused 
on the content of the leak, and stories that focused on the details of the hack. The former implies that the 
kāshif (revealer, divulger) responsible for the HLO has successfully portrayed their target as makshūf 
(revealed, uncovered). The latter implies that these roles have been reversed, and the actor that 
conducted the HLO has become makshūf — they are the one whose secrets have been revealed. The 
relationship between these two forms of coverage demonstrates the weight of coverage of the scandal 
overall, with each story’s focus directed towards the hacking operation itself or towards the content 
revealed by the hack. Although most stories collected in Figure 1 mentioned both elements, there was 
usually a clear prioritization of one angle over the other.  
This prioritization is illustrated in an extreme form by two disinformation websites present in the media 
coverage analyzed here: one, promoting negative stories about Qatar, called Qatarileaks, and the other 
doing the same for the UAE, called Emiratesleaks. The Qatarileaks website and Twitter account were 
created in May 2017, while the Emiratesleaks website was created on Jan. 2, 2018. The Qatarileaks 
website covered Broidy’s accusations of hacking by Qatar and did not mention the Al-Otaiba leaks at all. 
Conversely, the Emiratesleaks website covered the revelations in Broidy’s emails but not the accusations 
























































































































































































































Table 2: Headlines of Disinformation Stories on Selected HLO Cases 
Case Qatarileaks Emiratesleaks 
English Arabic English Arabic 




accused of Broidy 
email hack are in 
trouble96 
 
n/a Emirati academic 
boasts of his country’s 
role in the toppling of 
US foreign minister97 
Al-Otaiba leaks n/a n/a Millions of 
dollars spent by 
UAE to lobbyists 
in Washington98 
Arrangement with 





These two forms of coverage were also represented in the other news articles collected, albeit in a less 
extreme form. I therefore coded all articles as prioritizing either the hack or the leak elements of the 
scandal, based on a qualitative judgement of the headline of the article (Figure 2).The results indicate 
interesting variation: Media coverage of the Al-Otaiba case mainly focused on the leak contents; coverage 
of the Bezos case focused on the hack; and the Broidy and Azima cases were split roughly evenly, with 
more coverage overall of the Broidy case.100  
 
 
95 Qatarileaks, "Broidy Files New Lawsuit against Qatar," Qatarileaks, Jan. 26, 2019, 
https://qatarileaks.com/en/leak/broidy-files-new-lawsuit-against-qatar. 
96 Qatarileaks, "Murtaziqa Qatar Al-Mutawaraṫīn Biqurṡanat ʾīmailāt Brwaidī Fī Maʾaziq [Qatari Mercenaries 
Accused of Broidy Email Hack Are in Trouble]," Qatarileaks, June 9, 2019, https://qatarileaks.com/ar/leak/. 
97 Emiratesleaks, "ʾakādīmī ʾimārātī Yatafākhiru Bidūr Balādihi Fī Al-ʾiṫāḣa Biwazīr al-Khārijīyya al-ʾamrīkī [Emirati 
Academic Boasts of His Country’s Role in the Toppling of US Foreign Minister]," Emiratesleaks, March 15, 2018, 
https://emiratesleaks.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-15/. 
98 Emiratesleaks, "Millions of Dollars Spent by UAE to Lobbyists in Washington," Emiratesleaks, April 19, 2019, 
https://emiratesleaks.com/en/millions-dollars-spent-uae-lobbyists-washington/. 
99 Emiratesleaks, "Tansīq Maʿa Mustashārīn Litrāmb Litazwīd Al-ʾimārāt Bimuʿalūmāt Ḣasāsa [Arrangement with 
Trump Advisors to Give UAE “Sensitive” Information]," Emiratesleaks, June 28, 2018,  
https://emiratesleaks.com/%D8%B5%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9-10/. 
100 There are a few methodological problems with focusing on explicit mentions of “hacks” and “leaks” or allusions 
to them in the title, as it may lead to undercounting of leaks. This is especially true in the salacious coverage of the 
Bezos case, where the editor may not wish to include any information of hacks or leaks in the title. But this is not 
the case for others; for example, Al-Otaiba stories generally mention leaked emails in the title even when focusing 







Figure 2: Hack-and-leak Media Coverage Focus, 2016-2019 
 
 
Explaining the Trajectory of Simulated Scandals 
There are several potential explanations for the differing media coverage pertaining to each of the four 
hack-and-leak case studies. These HLO cases are complex, multi-causal events, and the explanations are 
complementary rather than competing. The fluid identities of kāshif and makshūf are relevant 
throughout, with both sides vying to maintain control of the narrative and avoid being portrayed as the 
object of scandal. 
First, in terms of comparative analysis with the DNC leaks, one potential explanation is that political 
affiliation influences coverage, so that in the case of the DNC leaks the Russian hack-and-leak operation 
received greater coverage than the contents of Clinton’s emails due to the leftward leanings of the 
“mainstream media.” If treated as a serious hypothesis rather than conspiracy theory, a political spectrum 
explanation is neither clearly supported nor disproved by the cases considered here. Three cases do not 
have a clear domestic political affiliation (Al-Otaiba, Azima, Bezos). The one case with a clear affiliation, 
Broidy, has evenly split media coverage. Recognizing that these cases are transnational as well as 
domestic, a similar argument based on different sides of political divisions in the Gulf is also unsupported, 
as these cases come from both sides of the 2017 Qatar split, with differing results.  
The scandal literature suggests that the type of scandal — moral, political, financial, and so on — may 
affect impact. In these cases, the leaking actor occasionally named a specific type of transgression. For Al-












and cause policy change.”101 In the Broidy case, the alleged leakers sought to “expose” him, although a 
court judged that leaking details of political and business meetings did not constitute a disclosure of 
private facts in Californian law because they did not sufficiently “shock … decency and propriety.”102 
Although there is no explicit rationale available in the Azima or Broidy case, the content of the initial 
publications — “scammer” for Azima and “illicit affair” for Bezos — also point to specific types of 
transgression. Overall, the leaked information covers a broad range of topics, neither supporting nor 
disproving the view that a certain kind of scandalous information has greater impact.  
More specifically, it is not clear that “moral” scandals lead to a focus on content rather than hacking. Both 
the Bezos and Al-Otaiba cases highlighted supposedly transgressive sexual conduct, with an opposite 
focus for media coverage.103 The common element between these cases is therefore not a particular type 
of scandal, but that the hack-and-leak operation aimed to show that expected standards were not met —  
what I earlier termed “normative dissonance.” 
Other potential explanations include the competence and resources of the leaking actor. Competence 
does not appear to be a good explanation, as reported attributions in all cases suggest highly motivated 
foreign state actors that are familiar with U.S. politics and possess sufficient financial and technical 
resources to accomplish their aims. Furthermore, all four cases appeared to use either relatively simple 
but effective techniques, such as spear-phishing (sending emails deliberately crafted to convince their 
recipient to click on a malicious link), suggesting a relatively low level of investment for state actors. The 
news organizations that covered these stories also saw them as part of strategically planned operations. 
One journalist claimed that “there was thought and calculation behind how this material was being 
distributed.”104 Others labelled it a new level of cybersecurity threat.105 Journalists published these stories 
despite being aware of this strategic aim. As The New York Time’s David Kirkpatrick explained: “If we were 
to start rejecting information from sources with agendas, we might as well stop putting out the paper.”106 
Nonetheless, the format of leaked information may have played a role in deciding the impact of the 
scandal: Extensive document leaks lend themselves to multiple releases, while a few texts and pictures 
have limited potential to sustain attention across news cycles. 
Another explanation suggested by these cases is that a cover identity for the leaking actor shifts focus 
onto the content of the leak, even if such a cover is implausibly deniable.107 Attribution is a notoriously 
difficult element of any cyber intrusion.108 In addition to limited information and ulterior motives on the 
 
101 Poulsen, "Hackers Vow to Release Apparent Trove of U.A.E. Ambassador’s Emails.” 
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Memorandum Opinion.” 
103 It is possible that stories “about” the hack were an excuse or pretext for more salacious discussion of moral and 
sexual subjects; this is difficult to determine from the data here.  
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part of the attributing party, state actors in general rarely claim responsibility for cyber operations, either 
staying silent or issuing denials (as in these cases). Attribution is also affected by the interests and 
capabilities of investigating experts. For example, some commentators linked the Al-Otaiba case to a spoof 
website registered by the Russian intelligence services for the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs; it is unclear 
whether the two are in fact related.109  
Consequently, fake identities that deliberately confuse attribution, acting as “false flags,”110 may prevent 
media coverage focusing on the hack and shift attention to the content, changing the direction of the 
scandal. In the Al-Otaiba and Broidy cases — the two with the most media coverage of leaked content — 
the leak came from “activist” identities (GlobalLeaks and L.A. Confidential, respectively). This tactic echoes 
other HLO activist identities such as the DNC’s DCLeaks, Football Leaks, and Hollywood Leaks.111 
It is likely that the target’s response to the initial leak also partly determines whether media coverage 
focuses on the hack or the leak elements of the incident. Al-Otaiba’s response consisted mainly of 
downplaying the relevance and credibility of the leaked information. In the Bezos case, the impact of the 
“blackmail,” as Bezos termed it, was diminished because he published the same information himself, 
accompanied by blogs speculating on the origin of the hack and followed by professional technical reports. 
Both the Azima and Broidy cases involved exchanges of lawsuits between the target and the claimed 
intruder, as well as public relations (PR) agencies. Some of these PR agencies and associated cybersecurity 
firms were reportedly involved in the initial leaks: Bell Pottinger for the Azima case and Stonington 
Strategies, Bluefort Public Relations, and Global Risk Advisors in the Broidy case.112  
Overall, a strong and carefully managed publicity campaign, whether conducted on highly visible open 
sources (as for Bezos), or through lawsuits and lobbying (as for Broidy), seems to deflect media attention 
from the content of the leak. Crucially, these responses supplied a clear alternative message, capitalizing 
on a recognized media appetite for cybersecurity and hacking topics to portray the incident as primarily a 
hack rather than a leak.113 Hacking tools were no longer just a useful means to generate a story; they 
became the story itself. In these cases, the struggle between kāshif and makshūf hinged on whether an 
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opponent’s use of hacking tools could be successfully exploited by supportive media or commercially 
retained PR agencies as a superior scandal to the original leak.  
Finally, this reversal of the kāshif/makshūf relationship is not merely a simple dynamic of punch and 
counterpunch, but becomes more complicated when we examine the details of Broidy’s response. 
Specifically, it appears that Broidy’s lawyers and PR agents used digital tools in at least two ways to obtain 
evidence which they then deployed to accuse Qatari agents of the original hack. First, they engaged in 
standard cybersecurity incident response including legal and technical measures. For example, once 
Broidy’s team had identified a TinyURL shortening service used to construct the initial phishing website, 
they then reportedly “issued subpoenas for every website created by the TinyURL user who made the 
phishing websites.”114 It is possible the L.A. Confidential email address used to leak the documents was 
registered by the same person who registered these websites and shortened links, which would have 
enabled Broidy’s team to link them together. Second, and more importantly, Broidy’s lawsuits rely on 
phone records and WhatsApp messages from the devices of individuals employed by PR agencies 
contracted by Qatar for the period in which the leaks occurred. There is no public data to indicate how 
these records and messages were obtained, although a story by The New York Times suggests that a 
private conversation between these individuals had been covertly recorded in addition to the collection 
of metadata with call times and contacts.115 If those investigating the hack-and-leak also engaged in covert 
recording and leaking of private conversations, then the delicate balance between kāshif and makshūf 
could shift once again.  
Conclusion 
This article has sought to widen the empirical basis of academic and policy debates around hack-and-leak 
operations by analyzing four cases of HLO in U.S. politics in the three years following the 2016 presidential 
election. These HLO are examples of what sociological theories term the simulation of scandal: strategic 
attempts to exploit normative dissonance — a divergence between expected norms and standards and 
actual practices — to gain advantage in domestic and international political struggles.  
Although hacking tools provide a new and relatively accessible means to obtain secret information 
necessary to simulate scandals, they pose an equal danger for those who use them: The risk that the target 
of the scandal will successfully portray the hack as more media-worthy than the content of the leak, 
reversing identities of kāshif (revealer) and makshūf (revealed). The cast list in this manufactured morality 
play is wider than a typical list of state actors, one that includes elected officials or government 
employees. It is also wider than the usual cast list of cyber conflict, already extended to include many non- 
and semi-state actors, and now extended still further to the wide range of legal, reputational, and PR 
services that are called upon during scandals caused by HLO. 
This article has multiple limitations, which highlight the importance of further work on this topic. These 
cases continue to evolve, with new data emerging between the initial analysis and the time of writing. 
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The media analysis conducted here could be augmented in many ways. For example, more data on the 
impact of these cases, rather than inferred impact from popular news articles, could be included in the 
data set. Data on participation in the reception of scandal by consumers of these news articles, especially 
on large social media platforms, would also test this article’s conclusions. It is beyond the scope of this 
article to tackle in detail the relationship of HLO to other forms of disinformation. But the theoretical 
stance taken here poses a note of caution for studies of HLO impact, as it is difficult for such studies not 
to be caught up in the unfolding dynamic of scandal itself.  
The qualitative judgements taken throughout this article represent a position on how the scandal 
unfolded, including an assessment of source reliability and the events of the HLO, that is inescapably part 
of the continued development of these events. This article therefore cannot hold on to a pretense of 
complete objectivity. Furthermore, judgements of strategic intent are especially tentative in this 
environment. Although the HLO considered here sought to induce normative dissonance, a separate and 
possibly secondary strategic goal may simply to be to instill doubt and uncertainty about the event itself 
— the operations may have been designed to generate apathy rather than condemnation. Measuring HLO 
impact against that aim would be still more difficult. 
Nonetheless, this article has several implications for strategic cyber competition. It highlights the risks of 
engaging in HLO operations, which can easily backfire and create scandal around the operation itself, 
rather than its intended subject. It emphasizes that cyber threats to the United States from adversarial 
states such as Russia and China should not be the only policy focus, as states that are strong military allies 
and strategic partners also employ cyber techniques to influence U.S. domestic politics. Such relationships 
mean that the strategic options for interference available to allied actors are limited, making covert cyber 
operations even more attractive. Such actors seek to bend rules and norms around interactions between 
allies, carefully pushing boundaries rather than breaking them. The involvement of multiple commercial 
entities, from cybersecurity companies to the less frequently noticed actions of PR agencies, makes clear 
rule-setting even more difficult. Finally, the erratic dance between kāshif and makshūf in hack-and-leak 
operations means that their impact is difficult to determine, let alone predict, both for perpetrators and 
targets. Successes are likely to be temporary, creating just enough pressure and distraction to prevent 
action in other areas. In a landscape of permanently competing narratives, this kāshif/makshūf dynamic 
is never fully decided and a new scandal, especially one revolving around illicit hacking, can open a crucial 
window of opportunity for adversaries.  
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